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Non-technical summary
Financial crises are usually described as failures of financial institutions or sharp falls in asset
prices. Since long, there is an active debate about the origins and nature of such crises. For
example, one view holds that they are the expression of an occasional inherent malfunctioning of
financial institutions or markets, e.g. related to self-fulfilling events and sunspots. Another view
rather sees crises as caused by bad outcomes in underlying economic variables (fundamentals).
The primary concern with financial crises is that they can reach a large breadth, in the sense that
banks fail or markets crash together. The reason for this concern is that these widespread (or
systemic) crises have the strongest real effects, in that aggregate consumption, investment and
growth are adversely affected. A recent literature on financial contagion and systemic risk has
therefore started to pay attention to the breadth of crises. The present paper provides a new
perspective on this issue. By combining exchange rate theory with multivariate extreme value
analysis, we derive conditions under which widespread currency market crises occur
systematically.
Within the context of a standard exchange rate model, we show that the magnitude of the cross-
currency interdependence during crisis periods hinges upon the statistical properties of extreme
outcomes for the fundamental variables determining exchange rates. More specifically, if
exchange rate returns are linearly related to domestic and foreign fundamentals, then different
exchange rate returns against the same base currency are correlated. Nevertheless, we show that if
one currency return reaches crisis levels, the probability that the other currency breaks down as
well vanishes if the forex fundamentals have “thin tails” (i.e. extreme outcomes of fundamentals
are very rare). In other words, joint currency crises are neither very frequent nor do they exhibit
vehemence under this condition. Alternatively, if the fundamentals exhibit “heavy tails” (extreme
fluctuations of fundamentals are less rare), the probability that the other currency breaks down as
well remains strictly positive. In this case severe joint crises do happen relatively frequently. We
develop our point in the context of exchange rates and currency crises, but the argument is more
general, applying to crises in many financial markets.
Our main result is as simple as it may surprise. Two basic conditions are sufficient for systemic
(widespread) currency market crises to occur frequently and with vehemence. First, the univariate
distributions describing the behaviour of underlying economic variables are heavy tailed. Second,
nominal bilateral exchange rates, expressed against the same currency, are linear expressions of
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the domestic and base currency fundamentals. The interesting and first novel element of this
result is that the degree of cross-sectional dependence between exchange rate returns during crisis
periods (so called asymptotic dependence), and thereby the breadth of currency crises, seems to
be related to the univariate frequency of extreme realisations in macroeconomic fundamentals.
The combination of asset pricing (here exchange rate) theory with extreme value analysis is the
second, more methodological novel element of our paper. While fat tails and tail dependence of
asset returns have by now been extensively documented in the empirical literature, how the
marginal tail thickness relates theoretically to the bivariate tail dependence of returns in standard
asset pricing models has - to the best of our knowledge - not been dealt with before.
Based on our analysis one may classify currency linkages during times of market stress into a
weak and a strong type, depending on whether the conditional crash probability respectively
vanishes or persists. Correspondingly, the international monetary and financial system may be
characterised as being relatively stable in the former case, while it is more fragile in the latter
case. Our two conditions, linearity and univariate heavy tails, are sufficient for having a more
fragile system.
While the former condition is more intrinsic to the structure of the economy, the latter condition
is related to economic policy, as public authorities can influence the distribution of underlying
economic variables. If policy makers abstained from any action that may cause or accommodate
extreme movements in economic fundamentals, then they would help avoiding widespread
currency crises. In normal times this may mean e.g. to conduct monetary and fiscal policies with
a steady hand, avoiding drastic changes in money supply or government expenditures. In very
volatile times it may mean to counteract fluctuations in fundamentals through decisive action. In
this fashion the frequency of extreme outcomes in underlying economic variables would be
reduced.
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1. Introduction
Financial crises are usually described as failures of Þnancial insti-
tutions or sharp falls in asset prices. Since long there is an active
debate about the origins and nature of such crises. For example, one
view holds that they are the expression of an occasional inherent mal-
functioning of Þnancial institutions or markets. Another view rather
sees crises as caused by bad outcomes in underlying economic variables
(fundamentals). Representative of the Þrst view is the literature mod-
elling univariate crises as self-fulÞlling events in the presence of mul-
tiple equilibria (sunspots). For example, Diamond and Dybvig (1983)
show that bank depositor runs can occur as a self-fulÞlling prophecy,
which would imply that they happen more or less randomly. Obst-
feld (1986) argues that also currency crises can occur as a consequence
of multiple equilibria. This is in contrast with the literature pointing
to the fact that many such crises seem to have occurred in relation
to unfavourable macroeconomic conditions, sometimes caused by bad
policies. For example, Gorton (1988) makes forcefully the point that
most episodes of banking instability in US history seem to have been
related to business cycle downturns rather than occurring randomly.
Krugman (1979) shows how unsustainably large budget deÞcits can
lead to currency attacks.
The primary concern with Þnancial crises is that they reach a large
breadth, in the sense that banks fail or markets crash together. The
reason for this concern is that these widespread (or systemic) crises
have the strongest real effects, in that aggregate consumption, in-
vestment and growth are adversely affected. A more recent litera-
ture on Þnancial contagion and systemic risk has therefore started to
pay attention to the breadth of crises. For example, Allen and Gale
(2000) model the spreading of bank failures through interbank expo-
sures. Masson (1999) illustrates various forms of joint currency crises in
a macroeconomic two-country model, covering both self-fulÞlling and
fundamentals-based crises. First empirical tests of joint currency crises
have already been provided by Eichengreen, Rose and Wyplosz (1996)
or Kaminsky and Reinhart (2000).1 As understanding the spreading
of Þnancial crises is very important (for the reason given above), the
present paper provides a new perspective on this issue. More speciÞ-
cally, by combining exchange rate theory with extreme value analysis,
we derive conditions under which widespread crises occur systemati-
cally.
1For a broader survey of the contagion literature, see De Bandt and Hartmann
(2000).
We develop our point in the context of exchange rates and currency
crises, but − as we will explain below − the argument is more general,
applying to crises in many Þnancial markets. Within the context of
a simple affine exchange rate model, we show that the magnitude of
the cross-currency interdependence during crisis periods hinges upon
the tail properties of the marginal distributions of the variables deter-
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minig exchange rates. More speciÞcally, suppose that the logarithmic
exchange rate returns are an affine function of the domestic and for-
eign fundamentals. This implies that different exchange rate returns
against the same base currency are correlated. Nevertheless, we show
that if one currency return reaches crisis levels, the probability that
the other currency breaks down as well (increasing the threshold at
which one speaks of a crisis without bound) vanishes asymptotically,
if the forex fundamentals are thin tailed (e.g. normally distributed).
In plain English, joint currency crises are neither very frequent nor do
they exhibit vehemence under this condition. Alternatively, if the fun-
damentals exhibit heavy tails, the probability that the other currency
breaks down as well remains stricly positive in the limit. In this case
severe joint crises do happen relatively frequently.
Our main result is as simple as it may surprise. Two basic condi-
tions are sufficient for systemic (widespread) currency market crises to
occur frequently and with vehemence. First, the univariate distribu-
tions describing the behaviour of economic variables are heavy tailed.
Loosely speaking, the heavy tail feature means that the probability of
univariate currency collapses is much higher than what one would ex-
pect if the underlying fundamentals were normally distributed. Second,
nominal bilateral exchange rates, expressed against the same currency,
are linear expressions of the domestic and base currency fundamen-
tals. The interesting and Þrst novel element of this result is that the
degree of cross-sectional dependence between exchange rate returns
during crisis periods (so called asymptotic dependence), and thereby
the breadth of currency crises, seems to be related to the univariate
frequency of extreme realizations in macroeconomic fundamentals. We
derive this result by combining standard exchange rate economics with
multivariate statistical extreme value analysis.2 While fat tails and tail
dependence of asset returns have by now been extensively documented
in the empirical literature,3 how the marginal tail thickness relates the-
oretically to the bivariate tail dependence of returns in standard asset
pricing models has − to the best of our knowledge − not been dealt
2Recently, a number of studies contributed to the Þnancial contagion literature
by employing multivariate extreme value analysis to estimate extreme asset return
linkages (tail dependence). A Þrst generation of papers provides bivariate analyses
in the same asset class; see e.g. Straetmans (2000), Longin and Solnik (2001) and
Poon et al. (2001) for stock markets and Starica (1999) and Hartmann et al. (2003)
for foreign exchange markets. A second generation of papers either offers bivariate
analyses across different asset classes, such as stock-bond linkages and the ßight-to-
quality phenomenon in G-5 economies analyzed in Hartmann et al. (forthcoming),
or higher order multivariate linkages.
3Since the seminal work by Mandelbrot (1963), numerous studies have estimated
the tail thickness of univariate asset return distributions, generally Þnding more
frequent crashes than would be predicted by the normal distribution. The relative
occurrence of stock market extremes has by far received most of the attention; see
e.g. Blattberg and Gonedes (1974), Jansen and de Vries (1991) or Jondeau and
Rockinger (2003). Bond market extremes have been considered in Hartmann et al.
(forthcoming) for example. Boothe and Glassman (1987), Hols and de Vries (1991)
or Mittnik et al. (2000) e.g. investigate the tail fatness of foreign exchange rate
returns.
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with before. The combination of asset pricing (here exchange rate)
theory with extreme value analysis is the second, more methodological
novel element of our paper.
Based on this analysis one may classify currency linkages during
times of market stress into a weak and a strong type, depending on
whether the conditional crash probability respectively vanishes or per-
sists asymptotically. Correspondingly, the international monetary and
Þnancial system may be characterized as being relatively stable in the
former case, while it is more fragile in the latter case. Our two con-
ditions, linearity and univariate heavy tails, are sufficient for having a
more fragile system.
Our result has also some relevance for policy, as public authorities
can inßuence the distribution of underlying economic variables. If pol-
icy makers abstained from any action that may cause or accommodate
extreme movements in economic fundamentals, then they would help
avoiding widespread currency crises. In normal times this may mean
e.g. to conduct monetary and Þscal policies with a steady hand, avoid-
ing drastic changes in money supply or government expenditures. In
very volatile times it may mean to counteract ßuctuations in fundamen-
tals through decisive action. In this fashion the tails of the distributions
of unerlying economic variables would be made thinner.
The remainder of this note proceeds as follows. In section 2 we in-
troduce the canonical affine exchange rate model in which we study
the relationship between marginal tail thickness and bivariate tail de-
pendence. A discussion and comparison of different measures to char-
acterize currency linkages during periods of market stress is provided
in section 3. The central result of the note on the relationship between
the univariate properties of economic fundamentals and the frequency
and severity of exchange rate linkages during crises we derive in section
4. The two cases of thin tailed and fat tailed marginals are treated in
two separate subsections. Finally, section 5 contains a summary and
conclusions.
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income − and the semi interest rate elasticity times the interest rate
 (see e.g. Frenkel, 1976, or Obstfeld and Rogoff, 1996, ch. 8). In
Þrst differences the monetary model can be concisely summarized as
(2.1) ∆0 = ∆0 −∆
The linear in Þrst difference speciÞcation reveals two properties that
will prove crucial in the following sections. First, the set of multiple
exchange rates ∆0 (	 = 1 · · ·  
) all have the fundamental ∆0 in
common. This exposure to shocks in the numéraire currency may be
important, as illustrated e.g. in Aghion, Bachetta and Banerjee (2001).
For a set of emerging market currencies, they plot the ratio of dollar
denominated liabilities to claims with respect to foreign banks in 1997
right before the start of the Asian crisis. Given the high content of
dollar denominated debt, most of the emerging market currencies were
therefore highly exposed to the same US interest rate ßuctuations. Sec-
ond, (2.1) is linear in the Þrst differences of the composite fundamental
 and hence the individual fundamentals as well. The linear speciÞca-
tion conforms e.g. to the linear factor model used in Forbes and Chinn
(2003), who show that trade linkages are important transmitters of
shocks between countries.4
The use of linear models is by no means limited to the monetary
model or the exchange rate literature, cf. the popular Arbitrage Pricing
Theory for explaining equilibrium equity returns (Ross, 1976). Thus
our results pertain to linkages between other classes of assets as well.
Investment banks, for example, often hold sizable portfolios of com-
mercial company equity. Sharpe ßuctuations in the companies equity
portfolios in turn inßuence the banks own shareholder value. As long
as different investment banks hold stakes in the same companies with
heavy tailed distributed returns, bank stocks are necessarily interde-
pendent (see e.g. Acharya and Yorulmazer, 2003).
3. Measures of dependence
3.1. The correlation measure. A standard measure of dependence
is the coefficient of correlation  As is well known the means, variances
and the correlation coefficient of a pair of random variables completely
characterize the bivariate normal distribution. One must ask, however,
how well  captures the dependence if it is unknown whether the data
are normally distributed or not. SpeciÞcally, one wonders whether  ad-
equately captures the interdependence at crisis levels. Boyer, Gibson,
4Note that the monetary model captures the mirror image of the trade account
through movements in the capital account.
2. Affine Exchange Rate Models
Consider the standard monetary model of the log price of currency
j in terms of currency 0
0 = (0 − 0 + 0)− ( −  + )
= 0 −  	 = 1 · · ·  
 .
0 and  are composite fundamentals consisting of the logarithmic
money measure , the negative of the income elasticity times log real
10
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and Loretan (1997) have noticed that even if the normal model ap-
plies, verifying the market speak of increased correlation during times
of crisis by calculating conditional correlation coefficients can be illu-
sory. Forbes and Rigobon (2002) show that, indeed, if one corrects 
not much correlation change can be identiÞed around crisis times.
One of the problems associated with the concept of correlation is that
the data may be dependent, while the correlation coefficient is zero.
Consider e.g. the discrete uniform distribution on the 8 points (g120 ) ∈
{(1 1) (1−1) (−1 1) (−1−1) (2 2) (2−2) (−2 2) (−2−2)}. Due
to the symmetry of this distribution it is immediate that  = 0, though
the data are not independent. If g120 = −1,  cannot be equal to 2,
and {  1|  1} = 12, while unconditionally {  1} = 14
only. Hence,  and  are dependent and  does not capture this
dependence.5
Lastly, economists evaluating investments within expected utility
theory frameworks are not so much interested in the correlation mea-
sure itself; they rather have an interest in the trade-offs between risk
measured as a probability and the gains or losses, which are the quan-
tiles of the return distribution. As such the correlation is only an
intermediate step in the calculation of this trade-off between quantile
and probability. Therefore we like to turn to a measure which is not
conditioned on a particular multivariate distribution and which directly
reßects the probabilities and associated crash levels.
3.2. Co-crash probabilities. What is worrying for supervisors and
industry representatives is that a heavy loss in one market goes hand
in hand with a heavy loss in another market, destroying the real value
of a diversiÞed investment portfolio. More speciÞcally, one asks given
that    what is the probability that   , where  and  stand
for currency returns and  is the common high loss level.6 Since we are
interested in the extreme linkage probabilities, we will try to directly
evaluate these probabilities, bypassing the correlation concept.
If two random variables  and  are not independent, having some
information about one variable, say , implies that one has also in-
formation about the other variable,  . This can be readily expressed
as a conditional probability  {   |  }.We will, however, adopt
5The bivariate Student-t distribution constitutes another popular example. Even
if  = 0 the model still exhibits dependence because the joint distribution cannot
be factorized into the marginal dfs. In general, statistical or stochastic independence
is sufficient for a zero correlation coeffiicent but not vice versa, see e.g. Feller (1971).
6Without loss of generality we can take the two quantiles on which we condition
equal to 
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the related probability measure that conditions on any market crash,
without indicating the speciÞc market. This is the linkage measure
{  }+ {  }
1− { ≤   ≤ }
proposed in Hartmann et al. (forthcoming). The linkage measure,
even though it is the sum of two conditional probabilities, reßects the
expected number of currency crashes given that least one currency
has collapsed. To see this, let  denote the number of simultaneously
crashing currencies, i.e., returns exceeding , and write the condition-
ally expected number of currency crashes given a collapse of at least
one currency as  {| ≥ 1}.
From probability theory we have that
 {| ≥ 1} =
1
{    ≤ }+ { ≤    }
1− { ≤   ≤ } + 2
{     }
1− { ≤   ≤ } =
(3.1)
{  }+ {  }
1− { ≤   ≤ } 
The conditional expectation measure  {| ≥ 1} has also the advan-
tages that it can be easily extended beyond the bivariate setting and
that one does not need to specify the crashing, conditioning asset
whereby one would look only into one direction in the plane.
To develop some intuition for this measure as a device for measuring
dependence during times of market stress, consider two polar cases.
Case 1. If  and  are independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.)
and writing  = {  }, then
 {| ≥ 1} = 2
1− (1− )2 =
2
2− 
In the limit → 0 as →∞, and hence  {| ≥ 1}→ 1.
Case 2. If  =  and writing  = {  }, then
 {| ≥ 1} = 2
1− (1− ) = 2
Clearly, even as → 0, still  {| ≥ 1} = 2.
These two cases show that 1 ≤  {| ≥ 1} ≤ 2. In case the re-
turn pair is completely independent (Case 1),  {| ≥ 1} reaches its
lower bound for very large quantiles , which implies that the data are
also asymptotically independent. On the other hand, if the data are
completely dependent, then in the limit ( → ∞)  {| ≥ 1} will
12
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still equal 2 (complete asymptotic dependence). Also notice that even
though in the Þrst case the data are independent, the dependence mea-
sure  {| ≥ 1} is higher than 1 at all Þnite levels of  since even with
independent returns, there is a nonzero probability that two markets
will crash, given that at least one market crashes.
As for the intermediate case of imperfectly correlated returns ( 6= 0,
||  1), either  {| ≥ 1} = 1 (asymptotic independence) or 1 
 {| ≥ 1} ≤ 2 (asymptotic dependence), if the quantile  gets large.
In particular, one cannot rule out that currency returns are asymptot-
ically independent in the presence of a nonzero correlation.
4. Weak and strong currency crisis linkages
Within the affine currency model framework from section 2, we are
now ready to prove that the limiting value of (3.1) critically depends on
the tail properties of the marginal distributions of the currency funda-
mentals. We dub the crisis linkage as weak (asymptotic independence)
whenever  {| ≥ 1} = 1 in the limit, and strong (asymptotic depen-
dence) otherwise. If the former case applies, the international monetary
and Þnancial system is more stable as severe crises in one currency are
not associated with crises in other currencies, whereas in the latter case
it is subject to systemic risk and therefore more fragile. For example,
the existence of only weak crisis linkages implies the absence of the
statistically signiÞcant occurrence of currency contagion.
Assume that each of the countries composite fundamentals ∆ in
(2.1) is independent from all the other countries composite fundamen-
tals. Regarding the distribution of ∆ we either assume normality or
that the distribution exhibits heavy tails in the sense that tail proba-
bilities are declining as a power function of the quantile (to be made
precise below). Notice that tails of the normal distribution are gov-
erned by the exponential function whereas a heavy tailed model like
the Student-t exhibits a Pareto distribution-type decline. It is more or
less a stylized fact that many asset returns are heavy tailed. We show
that this necessarily leads to asymptotic dependence. Conversely, we
also show that if the fundamentals exhibit light tails, such as the normal
distribution, then the forex returns are asymptotically independent
In order to derive our main result it is sufficient to consider a three
currency system with composite fundamentals ∆0 = , ∆1 = − ,
and ∆2 = − such that ∆01 =  +  and ∆02 =  + . We may
assume that ,  , and  are i.i.d.7
7In practice, basic fundamentals like money supplies, national income levels and
interest rates cannot be considered as being independent across countries. However,
13
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4.1. Fundamentals with light tails. In this subsection we assume
that   and  are standard normally distributed random variables.
As normality is preserved under summation the pair of random vari-
ables (∆01∆02) exhibits a bivariate normal distribution with corre-
lation coefficient  = 12.
Proposition 1. If ∆01 and ∆02 follow a bivariate normal distrib-
ution with  = 12, then lim→∞ {| ≥ 1} = 1, so that the crisis
linkage is weak.
In order to prove this claim we use Sibuyas (1960) approach and the
following asymptotic expansion for the tail probability of a normally
distributed random variable:
(4.1) Pr{  } ∼ 1√
2


exp
µ
−1
2
(


)2
¶
  large
(see e.g. Abramowitz and Stegun, 1972, p. 932). To indicate equality
in distribution we use the double arrow symbol ⇒.
Proof. We start by noticing that the expectational linkage measure
(3.1) can be transformed as follows:
 {| ≥ 1} = Pr{∆01  }+ {∆02  }
1− Pr{∆01 ≤ ∆02 ≤ }
=
1
1− Pr{∆01∆02}
Pr{∆01}+{∆02}
(4.2)
Thus, we are left with proving that
lim
→∞
Pr{∆01  ∆02  }
Pr{∆01  }+ {∆02  } = 0
Evidently, the marginal tail probabilities in (4.2) are governed by the
asymptotic expansion (4.1), e.g. for ∆01 :
Pr{∆01  } = Pr { +    }
⇒ Pr
n√
2  
o
∼ 1√

1

−
24
for large  As for the joint exceedance probability in (4.2) an upward
bound exists:
it can be easily shown that the relationship we derive between marginal tail heav-
iness and bivariate tail dependence still holds for pairwise dependent  and 
The dependence − if present − actually even strengthens our results. By assuming
independence we isolate the most difficult case to prove.
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Pr{∆01  ∆02  } ≤ Pr {∆01 +∆02  2}
= Pr {2 +  +   2}
⇒ Pr{1
2
√
6  }
∼
r
3

1
2
−
23
Thus, upon combining the last expressions and under the stated
normality assumptions
Pr{∆01  ∆02  }
Pr{∆01  }+ {∆02  } =
Pr{∆01  ∆02  }
2Pr{∆01  }
≤
√
3
4
exp
µ
−
2
3
+
2
4
¶
→ 0 as →∞
Hence,
lim
→∞
 {| ≥ 1} = 1
¤
This asymptotic independence results is by no means limited to the
class of normal distributions. A similar procedure can be used to verify
the asymptotic independence for many other types of joint distribu-
tions. But the normal distribution appears most interesting, since it is
so often assumed in theoretical and empirical work on exchange rate
returns and in other asset pricing applications. Note that we have just
shown that this assumption implies that currency (or other Þnancial
market) contagion cannot occur systematically.
4.2. Fundamentals with heavy tails. Prior to relating the tail fat-
ness of exchange rate fundamentals to their degree of asymptotic de-
pendence, we need a formal deÞnition of what fat tails exactly means.
A random variable exhibits heavy tails if its distribution function  ()
far into the tails has a Þrst order term identical to the Pareto distrib-
ution, i.e.
(4.3)  () = 1− −() as →∞
where () is a slowly varying function such that
(4.4) lim
→∞
()
()
= 1   0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It can be easily shown that conditions (4.3)-(4.4) are equivalent to
(4.5) lim
→∞
1−  ()
1−  () = 
−   0   0
i.e., the distribution varies regularly at inÞnity. The tail index  can
be interpreted as the number of bounded distributional moments. And
as not all moments are bounded, we speak of heavy tails. Distribu-
tions like the Student-t, F-distribution, Burr distribution, sum-stable
distributions with unbounded variance all fall into this class. It can be
shown that the unconditional distribution of the ARCH and GARCH
processes belongs to this class as well. Note that Student-t distribu-
tions are often used in the empirical modelling of the unconditional
return of exchange rates, see e.g. Boothe and Glassmann (1987), while
GARCH process are extremely popular conditional models.
To derive our result, we need to use Fellers convolution theorem
(Feller, 1971, VIII.8).
Theorem 1. Let 	 be i.i.d. random variables with regularly varying
symmetric tails, i.e. as →∞
Pr{	 ≤ −} = Pr{	  } = −()
Then for the tail of the distribution of the sum of 	 ( = 1 · · ·  
)
(
-fold convolution) as →∞
Pr{

X
	=1
	 ≤ } = 1− 
−()
In three dimensions this theorem implies by the independence of the
	 that for large 
Pr{
3X
	=1
	 ≤ } ∼ 1−
3X
	=1
Pr{	  }
∼ Pr{1 ≤ }Pr{2 ≤ }Pr{3 ≤ }
= Pr{1 ≤ 2 ≤ 3 ≤ }
In other words, the probability on the area below the plane
P3
	=1	 = 
equals the probability on the lower bar {1 ≤ 2 ≤ 3 ≤ }. The
Þrst step is the Theorem 1. The second step is a consequence of the
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independence, which implies that the joint probability
Pr{1 ≤ 2 ≤ 3 ≤ } = Pr{1 ≤ }Pr{2 ≤ }Pr{3 ≤ }
= [1− −()]3
= 1− 3−() +  (−)
Thus for large quantiles  all mass concentrates along the axes, so
that hyperplanes and bars that cut the three axes at the same points
separate the same probability mass. This implies the following:
Proposition 2. Let ,  and  be i.i.d. random variables with reg-
ularly varying tails, i.e. as →∞
Pr{ ≤ −} = Pr{ ≤ −} = Pr{ ≤ −} = −()
Pr{  } = Pr{  } = Pr{  } = −().
Then
lim
→∞
 {| ≥ 1} = 4
3

Proof. By deÞnition
lim
→∞
 {| ≥ 1} = lim
→∞
Pr{∆01  }+ {∆02  }
1− Pr{∆01 ≤ ∆02 ≤ }
= lim
→∞
Pr{ +   }+ Pr{ +   }
1− Pr{ +  ≤  + ! ≤ } 
(4.6)
By Fellers convolution theorem 1 we directly have for the numerator
in (4.6) that
Pr{ +   }+ Pr{ +   } ∼ 2−() + 2−()
For the denominator
1− Pr{ +  ≤  +  ≤ }
note that the lines + =  and + =  are two of the three edges
of the triangular plane
P3
	=1	 =  in the positive quadrant. We noted
above that Fellers theorem implies that for large  all mass is along
the three axes. Hence, if we are interested in the joint probability of
being below any two of the three edges of the triangular plane, this is
necessarily equal to the probability of being below the triangular plane,
since the set of two edges cuts the three axes at the same points (as
the triangular plane). Hence,
1− Pr{ +  ≤   +  ≤ } ∼ 1− Pr{ +  +  ≤ }
∼ 3−()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Thus
lim
→∞
Pr{ +   }+ Pr{ +   }
1− Pr{ +  ≤  +  ≤ } = lim→∞
2−() + 2−()
3−()
=
4
3

¤
The two exchange rates returns∆01 and∆02 are asymptotically de-
pendent, since lim→∞ {| ≥ 1} = 43  1. Thus the crisis linkage
for this class of distributions is strong and the international monetary
and Þnancial system appears relatively fragile, exhibiting systemic risk.
Note, however, that proposition 2 does not imply that there are no
joint distributions that have heavy tailed marginals, positive correlation
and asymptotic independence. In fact one can easily verify that for e.g.
the bivariate Gumbel-Pareto distribution
 (g120 ) = (1− g120−)(1− −)(1 + "g120−−)   0 0  "  1
(constructed from the Farlie-Gumbel-Morgenstern copula) the mar-
ginals exhibit Pareto shapes, i.e., g120() = () = 1−− and that the
two variates are not independent. Nevertheless, the distribution ex-
hibits asymptotic independence. In this sense is the assumption about
the linearity of asset returns in the fundamentals in proposition 2 cru-
cial. One can also construct joint distributions, where the marginals
have exponential type thin tails, but which nevertheless exhibit as-
ymptotic dependence. A systematic analysis of crisis linkages implied
by non-linear exchange rate (or more general asset pricing) models is
beyond the scope of this note and left to future research. The above
result, however, implies that if the dependence arises from the linear
properties of the problem, the marginals necessarily have to exhibit fat
tails to obtain asymptotic dependence.
Finally, it has recently become popular to model dependence struc-
tures by chosing speciÞc copulas. Proposition 2 shows that if economic
theory implies that the dependence arises from a linear problem, then
one should limit oneself to the subclass of copulas that are consistent
with linearly induced asymptotic dependence.
5. Conclusion
It is by now well known that Þnancial returns exhibit heavy tails and
are thus nonnormally distributed. This implies that extreme market
conditions tend to happen more frequently than expected on the basis
of the normal distribution, which is used so often in standard asset
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pricing approaches. From the point of view of international Þnan-
cial stability and portfolio diversiÞcation, the strength of asset linkages
during crisis periods matters even more, as the linkages determine the
stability of the system as a whole. Several papers talk about increased
correlation between Þnancial assets or markets during crisis periods. As
has been argued before, the use of correlation analysis is not without
problems though. Since the correlation concept is just an intermediary
step in calculating probabilities, we prefer to deÞne market linkages in
terms of conditional probabilities and the expected number of market
crashes.
In the present paper we try to make two contributions. First, we
make a Þrst step to combine foreign exchange theory with extreme
value analysis, so as to better understand the nature of market link-
ages in crisis periods. Second, we examine the role of the univariate
properties of economic fundamentals for the strength and severity of
extreme market spillovers. Choosing the case of currency markets we
show that the fragility of the international monetary and Þnancial sys-
tem or its systemic stability hinges critically on the type of marginal
distribution that applies to the country fundamentals. More precisely,
we demonstrate that in linear exchange rate models the nature of inter-
dependence between different currencies in times of crisis is fundamen-
tally related to the univariate frequency with which large movements
in underlying economic variables occur.
Suppose that logarithmic exchange rate returns are a linear function
of the domestic and foreign fundamentals. This implies that differ-
ent exchange rate returns against the same base currency are corre-
lated, because they have partly common fundamentals. Nevertheless,
if one currency crashes, the probability that the other currency breaks
down as well vanishes asymptotically if the forex fundamentals exhibit
thin tails, as the case for the normal distribution. Alternatively, if the
marginal distributions exhibit heavier tails than the normal, e.g. are
Student-t distributed, the probability that the other currency breaks
down as well remains strictly positive even in the limit. We therefore
speak of, respectively, weak and strong crisis linkages between different
currencies. Correspondingly, the international monetary and Þnancial
system may be characterized as relatively robust in the former case,
where destabilising phenomena like contagion do not occur systemati-
cally, while it is relatively fragile in the latter case.
Two simple conditions are sufficient for the spreading of Þnancial
instability to be directly related to the distribution of the economic
fundamentals, fat tails and linearity. (We focus on exchange rates
here, but the results apply to any other asset, as long as its pricing is
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linear and the marginals are heavy tailed.) While the latter condition is
more intrinsic to the structure of the economy, the former condition is
related to economic policy. In regular circumstances, by pursuing their
policies with a steady hand instead of orchestring drastic changes
in variables like money supply, interest rates or public expenditure,
public authorities can diminish the scope for fat tails in fundamentals.
In speciÞc circumstances of large market-driven ßuctuations the same
result can be attained through strong counteracting measures. In the
light of our argument, policy institutions may in this way contribute
to the stability of the international exchange rate system.
Two directions for future research emerge from the note. On the
side of theory, it appears interesting to extend our analysis to non-
linear exchange rate (or asset pricing) models. Non-linear relationships
between exchange rates and fundamentals could emerge from target
zones (see Krugman, 1991) or from various forms of transaction costs
(see e.g. Dumas, 1992). On the empirical side, the numerous studies
of the tail behaviour of asset prices should be extended by systematic
studies of the tail behaviour of the main macroeconomic fundamentals.
This will indicate how frequent and severe spillovers of exchange market
crises can be. Both directions are beyond the ambition of the present
note.
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